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 On the Role of Newtonian Analogies 
in Eighteenth-Century Life Science
VITALISM AND PROVISIONALLY INEXPLICABLE 
EXPLICATIVE DEVICES
Charles Wolfe
Eighteenth-century vitalists are not . . . impenitent metaphysicians but rather prudent posi-
tivists, which is to say, in that period, Newtonians. Vitalism is first of all the rejection of all 
metaphysical theories of the essence of life. This why most of the vitalists referred to Newton 
as the model of a scientist concerned with observation and experiment. . . . (Canguilhem 
1977, p. 113)
9.1 INTRODUCTION
In trying to make sense of the multiplicity of Newtonianisms in eighteenth-century 
natural philosophy, scholarship has been gradually progressing in sophistication and 
increasing the fine-grained quality of its interpretive categories.1 For my part, I view the 
Newtonians as dividing into three large groups, which were always in interplay: experi-
mental Newtonians; metaphysical, ideological, methodological Newtonians; and ana-
logical Newtonians, who combine elements of the first two groups. In what follows 
I shall focus on the third set, which I believe to be less studied, through a series of cases 
of ‘analogical Newtonianism’ in eighteenth-century life science. I  thereby suggest a 
revision of Schofield’s “evolutionary taxonomy of eighteenth-century Newtonianisms” 
(Schofield 1978).
1 From Schofield’s (1978) “evolutionary taxonomy” to Shank’s “thicker” description of, e.g., 
Leibnizian Newtonians in the Berlin Academy, such as Maupertuis (Shank 2008). Shank tried—
successfully in my view (Wolfe and Gilad 2011)—to order Schofield’s extreme diversity, remind-
ing us that if there were various interests at work in eighteenth-century French Newtonianism, 
nevertheless there were some unifying features.
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The role Newtonian analogies played in the formulation of new conceptual schemes 
in Enlightenment physiology and medicine is an aspect that has not received much 
attention.2 And some self-proclaimed Newtonians in the life sciences are difficult 
cases because they also professed anti-mathematicism (see Sections 2 and 4). In con-
trast, the so-called ‘medical Newtonians’, like Archibald Pitcairne (who was Hermann 
Boerhaave’s professor in Leiden) and James Keill, have been the object of useful stud-
ies already (Brown 1977, 1981, 1987; Guerrini 1985, 1987); but they were engaged 
in a more literal project, seeking to directly transpose Newtonian laws into quantita-
tive models of the body. I shall be interested in something different here: less in direct 
empirical transpositions and more in the heuristic, constructivist yet  also empiricist 
usage of Newtonian analogies—for the analogical Newtonians share with empiricists 
such as Locke, and ‘medical empiricists’ such as Sydenham, a suspicion of essences and 
ontology, favoring instead an ‘observational’ attitude towards phenomena.
By means of a series of variations on Newton’s method of positing an unknown 
entity (such as gravity) from which a series of mathematical equations are derived—for 
instance, equations linking together phases of the moon and tides—the figures I shall 
examine claimed that if the Newtonian physician or physiologist can posit an unknown 
called ‘life’ and derive from it various other phenomena, from the functioning of the 
glands to digestion and sensation, these will appear as interconnected, goal-oriented 
processes that exist neither in an inanimate mechanism nor in a corpse. But signifi-
cantly, and in keeping with the empiricist roots of the analogy, no ontological claims 
were made about the nature of this vital principle; no attempts to causally connect such 
a principle and observable phenomena. This is not to say that the Newtonian analogy, 
or analogies, had a single, clear-cut role in Enlightenment life science. But reflecting 
on the analogy brings together diverse schools of thought, and cuts across a surprising 
variety of programs, models, and practices in natural philosophy; it is a story worth 
telling.
Newtonianism in Enlightenment life science at first appears to be a rather straight-
forward matter. Mainstream figures such as Hermann Boerhaave and Albrecht von 
Haller were self-proclaimed Newtonians seeking to apply the insights and methods 
of the great man to the newly emerging field we might call ‘biology’ (the term itself 
appeared in a usage we would recognize, in France and Germany in the late 1790s, 
with a few earlier uses in the previous decades, but not with a stable definition until 
approximately 1798).3 For Boerhaave, e.g., amongst the “solid parts of the human 
body,” “some resemble Pillars, Props, . . . some Axes, Wedges, Leavers and Pullies, 
2 With the under-discussed exception of Hall (1968), or studies focusing on individual figures in 
which the Newtonian dimension is highlighted, such as Roe (1984).
3 Caron (1988, pp. 231–232), McLaughlin (2002), Wolfe (2011b, pp. 209–210).
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others Cords, Presses or Bellows,” Pipes, etc. (Boerhaave 1752, p. 81). The first line of 
Haller’s highly influential textbook Elementa physiologiæ sharply stated an analogy for 
the study of living beings (in whom the minimal unit of living tissue is the fibre): “the 
fibre is to physiology what the line is to geometry” (Fibra enim physiologo id est, quod 
linea geometræ).4 In contrast, ‘heterodox’ figures such as John Toland or Denis Diderot 
partly reject Newtonianism, either for ideological reasons, because of a different con-
ception of matter, force and their relations, or due to a kind of tacit vitalism, according 
to which the science of living beings should not model itself on the science of gravita-
tion (Guédon 1979).
Yet Newtonianism in eighteenth-century life science was more complicated:  it 
didn’t consist simply in either the literal-minded transposition of some quantitative 
and/or methodological tool, or the fierce rejection of design and physicotheology that 
was characteristic of the “Radical Enlightenment.” As I will suggest, the appeal to a 
Newtonian analogy served as a stimulus to extremely diverse conceptual constructions 
in the ontology of Life in this period, constructions that appear quite distant from their 
source. Chief amongst these is the elaboration of what I will call, following an insight 
of T. S. Hall’s, provisionally inexplicable explicative devices. Hall alludes to a comment 
of Robert Whytt’s on how his method resembles Newton’s with respect to gravity, and 
reflects on how we should understand Newton’s influence on interpretive models in 
physiology. “One thing Newtonianism did,” Hall suggests, “was to legitimize the adop-
tion and use for interpretive purposes of what we may term ‘inexplicable explicative 
devices’, or ‘physiological unknowns.’ ”5 As we shall see, a variety of thinkers—profes-
sors of medicine, natural historians, physiologists, and naturalistically inclined philos-
ophers—including figures we would term ‘vitalists’, put these “inexplicable explicative 
devices” to work, in ways ranging from the more literal uses of Newtonian explana-
tions to the more analogical uses of what are by that point “explicative devices.”
Julian Martin has suggested that this can entirely be traced back to Roger Cotes’ 
preface to the second edition of the Principia (Martin 1990, p. 130). Cotes notes there 
that “effects of the same kind—that is, whose known properties are the same—have the 
same causes and their properties which are not yet known are also the same” (Cotes, 
in Newton [1713] 1999, p. 391). He also insists that gravity is not an occult quality (or 
cause): “occult causes are not those causes whose existence is clearly demonstrated by 
observations, but only those whose existence is occult, imagined and not yet proved” 
(p. 391). More boldly (because the former statement is, among other things, a stan-
dard statement of experimental philosophy), Cotes also says that “no mechanical 
4 Haller (1757, vol. 1, p. 2). In Diderot’s discussion this becomes “the fibre is to physiology what 
the line is to mathematics” (Éléments de physiologie, in Diderot 1975, vol. 17, p. 338).
5 Hall (1969, vol. 2, p. 73); cf. Hall (1968, p. 14).
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explanation can be given” for the simplest cause. Yet for several reasons, the real source 
is Query 31 of the Opticks.6 Most importantly, this is where Newton himself states the 
idea that Cotes alluded to: “what I call Attraction may be perform’d by impulse, or by 
some other means unknown to me. I use that Word here to signify only in general any 
Force by which Bodies tend towards one another, whatsoever be the Cause” (Newton 
[1730] 1952, p. 376). Newton also adds a very similar claim to Cotes’: that there is a 
great difference between arguments that rely on causes, the “principles” of which are 
not yet discovered, and “occult qualities” (pp. 401–402), because such arguments do 
not claim to establish a link between phenomena and “the specifick Forms of Things,” 
but rather to articulate “general Laws of Nature by which the Things themselves are 
form’d,” laws we grasp phenomenally (empirically, we might say), even though their 
causes are not yet known (p. 401). In short, and to reiterate a very famous Newtonian 
topos, by postulating unknowns Newton arrives at the law of gravitation.
I examine here the different ways in which this methodological and model-building 
insight of Newton’s was applied, carried over, reformulated, and otherwise appropri-
ated in eighteenth-century life science, in the formulation of what Hall termed “physi-
ological unknowns,” which are also conceptual appropriations. I distinguish between 
(§ 1) the literal use of Newtonian methodology in ‘medical Newtonianism’ (Pitcairne, 
Boerhaave, et al.), (§ 2) the non-literal transposition of his method in later physiol-
ogy and medicine (Buffon, Maupertuis, Hartley, et al.), which raises the question of 
whether or not this is a transposition of models, (§ 3) Albrecht von Haller’s so-called 
“Newtonian physiology,” which, I suggest, is really a physiology of ‘place-holders’ and 
mostly a weaker usage of the analogy, versus (§ 4) the heuristic, Newtonian-nourished 
vitalism of the Montpellier physicians, described as “prudent positivists” rather than 
“impenitent metaphysicians” in the epigraph to this essay (Canguilhem 1977, p. 113), 
and who make a strongly analogical usage of Newtonian methodology. Lastly (§ 
5)  I  examine some more skeptical approaches to Newtonianism and mathematics, 
on the part of ‘vital materialists’ such as Mandeville and Diderot, before concluding 
with some general reflections on the Newtonian analogy in vitalism and its empiricist 
ramifications.
One can speak of an empiricist dimension here, for some of the hostility to math-
ematics is also an explicit and recognizable empiricist posture, going back at least as 
to Bacon, Locke, and Sydenham, with a complex pedigree composed alternately of 
6 Query 31 was added to the Latin Edition of the Opticks (1706) and was then numbered 23; 
it became Query 31 in the newer English editions of 1717 and 1718. It is important that these 
Queries were composed during the final phase of Newton’s life, before the preface to the second 
edition of the Principia; they have a speculative—or at least exploratory—tone that distinguishes 
them from the rest of his work.
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Hippocrates, the medical empirikoi of antiquity and early modern empiricists (Wolfe 
2010a). Notably, the way in which the Montpellier vitalists move away from an ‘ontolo-
gization’ of the vital principle can be considered a kind of empiricism, in keeping with 
their insistence on the primacy of observation over experiment.
9.2 LITERAL MEDICAL NEWTONIANISM
Iatromechanism in its Scottish form, often referred to as ‘medical Newtonianism’, was 
a deliberate attempt to directly extend the power of Newtonian quantitative explana-
tions to the medical realm. Such figures as Archibald Pitcairne, James Keill, William 
Cockburn, Bryan Robinson, and George Cheyne lavished “quantitative and mathe-
matical attention” on “the hydraulics and general mechanics of the animal oeconomy” 
(Brown 1987, p.  641). They held that medicine should be based on ‘mathematical 
physick’ (in fact modeled on astronomy), with the goal of finding absolute laws inter-
connecting empirically established phenomena. Much more restrictively quantitative 
than anything in, say, Harvey, these physicians sought to measure quantities of blood, 
force, and velocities; Pitcairne even wanted to weigh the skin of a corpse (Cunningham 
1981, p. 93). More ambitiously, extending insights of iatromechanism, Pitcairne sought 
to construct a certain system based on elements that are themselves certain—fluids, 
velocities, dimensions of vessels, etc. In his 1692 Inaugural Lecture at Leyden, entitled 
“An Oration Proving the Profession of Physic Free from the Tyranny of any Sect of 
Philosophers,” Pitcairne emphasized the priority of mathematics over philosophy for 
physicians (Pitcairne 1715, p. 8); “Enquiries after physical causes as are generally pro-
posed by the philosophers are entirely useless and unnecessary to physicians” (p. 10). 
He later declared that “All Diseases of the Fluids consist either in a Change of their 
Qualities, or a Change of the Velocities of their Motions”; hence “The cure of every 
Disease, whether in the Vessels or Fluids, or both, is to be effected only by mechanical 
Laws.”7
Pitcairne criticized those who relied on fermentation for understanding vital pro-
cesses and instead emphasized the expansion and contraction of muscles—a point on 
which he could rely on the authority of Newton himself, who in the Opticks explained 
fermentation and putrefaction (and thus life) by the attraction of corpuscules rather 
than by any irreducible chemical process.8 There is a kind of mechanistic reduction of 
7 Elementa medicinae (1717), translated as The Philosophical and Mathematical Elements of 
Physick (1718, § LXXVIII, in Pitcairne [1718, p. 353]); § LXXXVII, in Pitcairne (1718, p. 354). 
See also Brown (1987, p. 641).
8 Of course, ‘Newton’ as referred to here and by the figures under discussion is the publicly vis-
ible Newton, not the author of alchemical notebooks in which a “fermental virtue” is posited 
that “accommodates itself to every nature [and] from metallic semen . . . generates gold, from 
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chemical entities here (different, however, from a Cartesian-mechanical reduction), as 
can also be seen in works such as the 1702 Mechanical Account of Poisons by Pitcairne’s 
disciple Richard Mead:  even poisons should be explainable in mechanistic terms 
(Mead refuted Boyle’s claim that the bite of a viper was more or less fatal depending on 
the rage of the viper). Similarly, George Cheyne also attacked ‘chymistry’ in the name 
of a confident mechanism, writing in 1702:  “All is nonsense, unless they first shew 
their systems and chymical effects to be necessary corollaries from the known laws of 
motion, i.e. unless their philosophy, and chymistry too, be first mechanically explain’d” 
(Cheyne 1702, p. 11, cited in Gaukroger 2010, p. 334).9
However, in a typical confirmation that we are not dealing with neat, entirely sepa-
rate categories here, but rather with interpretive distinctions, James Keill used the con-
cept of attraction, not to reject the relevance of iatrochemical explanations, but rather 
to justify them: medicine works by “uniting and augmenting the attractive force of the 
particles which compose the humours,” given that the particles of some humours unite 
to the “particles of some medicines” more easily than others; and certain humours 
“require different purgative medicine” to carry them through the glands (Keill 1708, 
pp. 65–66)—an even balance between chemical language and that of Newtonian attrac-
tion. Overall, “the whole animal economy depends on attractive power” (ibid., p. 8).
But more significantly for my comparative approach, we need to see just how literal 
the ‘medical Newtonians’ are in their way of being . . . Newtonian. Consider Proposition 
XII of Bryan Robinson’s 1732 Treatise on the Animal Oeconomy: “The Velocities of the 
Blood in the corresponding Blood-Vessels of Bodies Situated alike with respect to the 
Horizon, are in the subduplicate Ratios of the Diameters of the Vessels.”10 Or proposi-
tion XIV: “If an animal Fibre, by a Force acting on it, be increased or lessened, either 
in Length or Thickness; its Length will be reciprocally proportional to its Diameter . . .” 
(Robinson 1732, p.  103). It may not be surprising that Alexander Monro primus 
human [semen] men etc. . . .” (a proposition dated approx. 1669, Keynes Ms. 12A, cited in Iliffe 
1995, p. 445).
9 However, as Anita Guerrini has described, in later essays collected in the 1740 Essay on Regimen, 
Cheyne moved from a vision of the body as “nothing but . . . a Contexture of Pipes, an Hydraulic 
Machin” to an account in which circulation cannot be fully explained by “mere Mechanism, 
or the Laws of Motion which now obtain,” but instead requires a “primary self-existent cause” 
(Cheyne 1740, pp. xiii, 2–3; Guerrini 1985, p. 263).
10 Robinson (1732, pp.  113–114), Brown (1981, p.  351). Schofield, in his celebrated study of 
Newtonianism in English scientific and philosophical thought, thus completely misses the sig-
nificance of the Newtonian analogy in the life sciences, when he writes that Robinson’s much 
respected work “leavens an otherwise commonplace mechanistic physiology with a section on 
the aetherial cause of muscular motion” (Schofield 1970, pp. 108–109). Robinson’s hydraulics 
of the body may need “leavening” as writing, but it is anything but “commonplace mechanistic 
physiology,” with its mechanization of Newtonian forces!
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described Robinson as “a blind follower of Sir Isaac Newton assuming with most of his 
countrymen Sir Isaac’s queries as axioms . . . ,” what Brown described as “perpetrating 
mathematical excesses on the animal economy.”11
This kind of obsessively quantitative ‘mathematical physick’ was seen as particu-
larly useful in the dosing of medicines. So, William Cockburn, in his 1694 Oeconomia 
corporis animalis, argued by “apodictic arguments” that if we assume two “postu-
lates”—medicines can act only when they are mixed with the mass of the blood, and 
the general effect of a person’s peculiar “temperament” is only some alteration in the 
hydraulics of the circulating fluids—then we can conclude for bloods of equivalent 
thickness that
The doses of medicaments necessary to elicit a certain effect are proportional to 
the quantity of the blood; for if a particular dose were required to alter the thick-
ness of, say, one pound of blood to a particular degree, then twice the dose would 
be necessary in order to alter two pounds to the same degree, . . . [G] enerally, if 
the quantity of blood b requires dose d, then the quantity of blood mb requires 
the dose md (Cockburn and Southwell 1704, pp. 2119–2220).12
Some self-proclaimed Newtonian natural philosophers with medical or physiological 
interests also turned the direction of proof back toward Newton’s theory itself, and 
claimed that their researches, e.g., in the hydraulics of circulation (such as Stephen 
Hales’ Haemastaticks, the subtitle of which describes it as An Account of some Hydraulick 
and Hydrostatical Experiments made on the Blood and Blood-Vessels of Animals) could 
provide experimental proof of gravitational attraction, by using Newtonian theory “to 
explain the apparent rise of fluids inside capillary tubes” (Shank 2008, p. 404). Hales 
crosses several aspects of our story, if one considers the French translations of his 
two major works, the 1727 Vegetable Staticks and the 1733 Haemastaticks, by Buffon 
and the Montpellier professor of medicine François Boissier de Sauvages (1706–
1767), respectively. Buffon’s translation was a major moment of the implantation of 
Newtonianism in France (after Maupertuis’ Discours sur la figure des astres), as Voltaire 
loudly proclaimed, referring to the “penetration of Newtonian truths inside the Paris 
11 Monro primus, “The History of Anatomy,” Ms. 166, Medical Library, University of Otago, cited 
in Guerrini (2006, p. 9), Brown (1981, p. 311, referring to Cheyne and Mead).
12 See also Brown (1987, pp. 633–634). Keill has a comparable, but less restrictive discussion 
of the ‘mathematics’ of the relations between humours and medicines (Keill 1708, pp. 63–65). 
Mandeville, as I discuss below, strongly rejected this kind of argument, on empirical rather than 
a priori or otherwise ontological grounds, unlike Diderot, although the border separating these 
two attitudes is not clear-cut.
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academy despite the taste for Cartesianism that still dominates there.”13 Sauvages’ 
case, which I discuss in section 4, shows how medical vitalism made use of explicitly 
Newtonian concepts. But what we should retain for now is (a) the literal character of 
this medical-Newtonian project, (b) its degree of ontological commitment, that is, the 
extent to which it is neither a heuristic model nor an epistemological claim about how 
we come to know the body. Instead, descriptions of the body as just a “pure machine” 
abound, as in James Keill:
The Animal Body is now known to be a pure Machine, and many of its 
Actions and Motions are demonstrated to be the necessary consequences of 
its Structure. The manner of Vision is shown in Opticks. BORELLI has given 
us the Mechanism of the Bones and Muscles for the moving of the joints. And 
since the Discovery of the Circulation of the Blood by the famous Dr. HARVEY, 
many useful Propositions concerning its Motion and Velocity have been deter-
mined by BELLINI. Dr. PITCAIRNE has explained the mechanical structure 
of the Lungs . . . many Phaenomena of the Animal Body which the Ages past 
thought inexplicable, have now by several [persons] been made the Subjects 
of Geometrical Demonstration (Keill 1708, pp. iii–iv; 1717, pp. iii–iv [revised 
version]).14
In addition to this literal transposition of Newtonian quantification, it is important 
to note that the iatromechanist project runs counter to a basic ‘empiricist’ inclination 
to be skeptical or at least agnostic about the nature of life itself:  Pitcairne asserted 
unambiguously that “Life consists in the Circulation of the Blood produced by the 
Motion of the Heart and Arteries.”15 Thinkers as different as Locke and Sydenham on 
the one hand, and the Montpellier vitalists on the other hand, shared a ‘Hippocratic’ 
denial of, or at least suspicion of, this kind of definition and quantitative modeling of 
Life, along with a deep-rooted commitment to privileging observation over experi-
ment (Wolfe 2010a); chemical-materialists like Mandeville and Diderot share this 
13 Voltaire, Réponse aux objections principales qu’on a faites en France contre la philosophie de 
Newton (1739), in Œuvres complètes (Paris, 1829–1840, vol. 23, pp. 71–72); cited in Shank (2008, 
p. 408).
14 For discussion, see Guerrini (1985), Brown (1987). More generally, “the Animal Body is noth-
ing but a Machine, whose Actions and Motions are all performed by Fluids” (Keill 1708, p. 66; 
1717, p. 182).
15 Pitcairne, “Oratio qua ostenditur medicinam ab omni philosophorum secto esse liberam,” 
translated in Pitcairne (1715, pp. 9–10, 16, 24); cf. ibid., p. 95 and Pitcairne (1718, ch. VI, § 1, 
p. 71). This is discussed in Guerrini (1987, pp. 79–80) and Schaffer (1989, p. 177).
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denial, which they motivate either on empiricist and skeptical grounds (Mandeville) 
or more ontologically terms (Diderot), but are not hostile to experiment.
A more complex but still literal form of literal Newtonianism is the sophisticated 
medical mechanism of Herman Boerhaave (1668–1738), Professor of Medicine, 
Botany, and Chemistry at Leiden. Boerhaave was widely viewed as the most influential 
lecturer in medicine in Europe, and taught figures including la Mettrie and Haller. He 
frequently was described (and described himself) as a Newtonian, expanding the reach 
of mechanism beyond its Cartesian strictures, and incorporating chemical explana-
tions of the microstructure of the body. Prior to ‘s Gravesande’s appointment to the 
Chair of Physics in 1717, Boerhaave was the sole adherent of Newtonian physics in 
Leiden.16 He wrote and lectured extensively on the value of mathematical and mechan-
ical explanations in medicine, often metaphorically describing the parts of the body 
as pipes or vessels, “Pillars, Props, . . .  , some like Axes, Wedges, Leavers and Pullies, 
others like Cords, Presses or Bellows,” adding that the functions of the body are “all 
performed by mechanical Laws.”17
For Boerhaave the fibre was the basic unit of the solid parts of the human body, a 
unit defined in explicitly physico-mathematical terms: a fibre is a part of the human 
body considered as extended in length, but as having no parts in breadth. He thus com-
pared it to a mathematical line, defined as length without breadth.18 Further, his account 
of the nervous system has nerves “performing every action by vibration” (Boerhaave 
1715, p. 109), depending on various states of tension in the fibres.19 Another ‘medi-
cal Newtonian’, Henry Pemberton (a physician whose work attracted the interest of 
Newton in the 1720s, to the extent that Newton entrusted him with editing the third 
edition of the Principia) tried to map out what sort of curve occurs in the fibres of 
muscular vesicles, in the Introduction on Muscular Motion he wrote for the new edi-
tion of William Cowper’s Myotomia reformata in 1723 (Brown 1981, pp.  331–333). 
16 A.M. Luyendijk-Elshout, in her introduction to Boerhaave’s “Discourse on the achievement of 
certainty in physics,” in Boerhaave (1983, p. 145).
17 Boerhaave (1751 [1708, p.  81), and see his “Discourse on the achievement of certainty in 
physics” (Sermo academicus de comparando certo in physicis), § VIII, Boerhaave (1983, p. 158).
18 Van Swieten (1759, vol. 1, p. 38), cited in Lindeboom (1970, p. 206). Van Swieten, a close stu-
dent of Boerhaave’s, edited Boerhaave’s aphorisms with a commentary, a work Peter Hans Reill 
calls “the eighteenth century’s bible of medical mechanism” (Reill 2005, p. 121).
19 Bastholm (1950, p. 197). Sauvages reprised this theme of vibrations, and tied it to an (equally 
Newtonian-Boerhaavian) scheme of the body as a hydraulic machine. However, Sauvages 
added a Stahlian component, the soul as central explanatory principle in organic processes of 
self-maintainance (Dissertation sur les médicaments, in Sauvages 1770, vol. 2, pp. 26–27; Sauvages 
[1763] 1771, vol. 1 (“Prolégomènes”), pp. 4, 10, 45). However, Sauvages more generally defended 
the pertinence of mechanical and mathematical explanations in medicine (referring notably to 
Newton), as I discuss below.
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Updating the work of Keill, Borelli, and others, and appealing to Newton’s calculus of 
variations, Pemberton suggests contra Bernoulli that muscular vesicles do not become 
circular during distention, but rather take on the “Figure of the largest Cavity . . .” and 
“to determine this figure we must have recourse to the Problem concerning isoperi-
metrical Curves . . .”20
I now turn to the cases of three prominent figures in the mid-eighteenth century, 
Buffon, Maupertuis, and Hartley, who no longer seek to literally extend the scope 
of Newtonian explanations, but instead integrate into them properties that were 
not strictly present in the original, thereby decreasing the degree of recognizably 
Newtonian laws and principles in use.
9.3 NON-LITERAL TRANSPOSITIONS OF NEWTONIAN 
METHOD: BUFFON, MAUPERTUIS, AND HARTLEY
Voltaire notoriously described the great natural historian Buffon as the “head of the 
Newtonian party in France.”21 As Thierry Hoquet has reminded us, Buffon started out 
with no competence in natural history, but with a very good reputation in academic 
circles for his mathematical work, especially on the “jeu de franc-carreau” or “nee-
dle problem,” on the strength of which he was admitted quite early on to the Paris 
Academy of Sciences, at the age of 26.22 Buffon translated Newton’s Method of Fluxions 
in 1740, and entered into a polemic with Clairaut in which he defended the hypothesis 
of the unity of the law of attraction;23 much later on, in the Supplément to his Histoire 
naturelle, he criticized the (Stahlian) chemistry of affinities for failing to understand 
“the basic causal relation subtending [affinity], which is universal attraction.”24 Buffon 
also spoke in familiar accents against hypotheses in the preface to his 1739 translation 
of Stephen Hale’s Vegetable Staticks.
20 Pemberton in Cowper (1724, p. xxxv), Brown (1981, p. 334).
21 Literally, “Je suis l’enfant perdu d’un parti dont M. de Buffon est le chef ” (Voltaire, Letter XII 
to Helvétius, October 1739, in Helvétius 1818, p. 209; Besterman D2086); thanks to J. B. Shank 
for help finding this citation.
22 See Buffon (1733), reprinted in his Essais d’arithmétique morale in Buffon (1749–1788, 
Supplément, vol. 4, § 23) and the discussion in Hoquet (forthcoming).
23 Buffon, “Réflexions sur la loi de l’attraction,” in Buffon (1749–1788, vol. 30 (Suppléments I), 
pp. 126f; originally in Mémoires de l’Académie royale des Sciences, 1745; a response to Clairaut’s 
paper “Du système du monde dans les principes de la gravitation universelle”).
24 Buffon, “Des Elemens,” in Buffon (1749–1788, vol. 30 (Suppléments I), p. 75). In the “Seconde 
vue” of De la nature, Buffon corrects Newton for being inconsistent, and for not seeing that 
chemical affinities do not obey laws like that of gravitation; rather, they obey the law of gravita-
tion (1749–1788, vol. 13, p. xiv).
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In a short slogan, one could say that Newton was useful to Buffon in conceptual-
izing an anti-Cartesian science of life. In the Histoire naturelle, he noted that his ideas 
would not convince those who (dogmatically, as it were) “only accept a certain num-
ber of mechanical principles,” and in a familiar turn of phrase, added that he “sup-
poses causes.”25 Buffon was not a literal Newtonian who thought attraction could be 
extended to other phenomena, or that attraction was the general law of Nature (as 
seems to be the case in his polemic with Clairault). Instead, attraction for him was a 
means to widen the scope of science, away from strict mechanism. As Hoquet puts it, 
attraction “is useful less in what it poses than in what it opposes; it enables Buffon to 
make room for other causes, other general effects, applying to other law-bound sets of 
phenomena” (Hoquet 2005, p. 171). But in a number of relevant ways, the project (and 
contents) of Buffon’s Histoire naturelle are non-Newtonian—which does not mean they 
are anti-Newtonian.26 As I discuss below (§ 5), this takes the form of a hostility toward 
abstraction and mathematics, and a concomitant defense of the autonomy of the life 
sciences.
Maupertuis is a more complex case, for he was both a Newtonian—seeking to 
extend the explanatory scope and applicability of the force of attraction—and also 
considered that Newtonian attraction did not sufficiently account for organic phe-
nomena such as the processes of generation, or even “the simplest chemical opera-
tions.”27 In his Système de la nature ou Essai sur les corps organisés he reflected on 
this at length, accepting that the same force of gravitation-attraction that controls the 
behavior of bodies in space governs the formation of organic bodies, but also rein-
terpreting the force of attraction as affinity.28 Thereby this force shifts from being a 
strictly mechanical process understood in Newtonian fashion, and gains ‘Leibnizian’ 
qualities. His vision of matter sounds more monadic at this point, given that each min-
imal component of living matter (which he calls “molecules”) possesses higher-level 
intellective features:
A uniform, blind attraction spread over the parts of matter would not explain 
how these parts are arranged to form the most rudimentary organized bodies. 
25 Buffon, Histoire générale des Animaux III, De la nutrition et du développement, in Buffon 
(1749–1788, vol. 2, p. 50).
26 Hoquet (2005, pp. 32–33) and passim, for excellent analysis of Buffon as Newtonian, or not; 
Hoquet is gently skeptical about the extent of Buffon’s Newtonianism.
27 Maupertuis ([1756] 1965, § III, p. 141).
28 This text first appeared in Latin in 1751 as Dissertatio inauguralis metaphysica de universali 
naturae systemate, under the pseudonym Dr Baumann; it was translated by Maupertuis in 1754 
as Essai sur la formation des corps organisés and was later included in his 1756 Œuvres under the 
title Système de la nature. I analyse this text in Wolfe (2010b).
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If they all possess the same tendency and the same force to join them together, 
why then do some form the eye and others the ear? Why is there this wonder-
ful arrangement? Why do they not join haphazardly? If an explanation is to be 
attempted, even if founded entirely on analogy, some principle of intelligence 
must be applied, something similar to what we call desire, aversion, memory. 
(Maupertuis (1756) 1965, § XIV, pp. 146–147, original emphasis)29
Thus, for Maupertuis, in order to explain the formation of organized bodies, intellec-
tive (or ‘psychic’) properties must be added to the physical properties of matter. By 
endowing these “living particles” with a kind of memory, the regularity of the unfold-
ing of organic processes and even the existence of trait heredity (precisely a kind of 
Newtonian unknown), can be explained.
David Hartley has been described as having a “Newtonian neuropsychology” in 
his 1749 Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty and His Expectations (Smith 
1987). This is an attempt at a ‘vibratory’ materialist account of mind, according 
to which small vibrations (“vibrunticles”) are impressed in the solid filaments of 
the nerves by external objects; these sensations are transmitted by ætherial vibra-
tion to the infinitesimal particles that make up the substance of the brain. Indeed, 
Newton himself had suggested a ‘vibratory basis of sensation’ in some Queries of the 
Opticks,30 and Hartley explained that he came to his idea of vibrations from reading 
Newton’s Principia (the General Scholium), the æther queries, and Newton’s Letter 
to Boyle.31 Hartley also acknowledged some limitations in seeking to fill in Newton’s 
blanks:
It seemed credible to Newton that a very subtle and elastic fluid, and hence 
very suitable for reception and communication of vibrations both lies hid in 
gross bodies and is diffused through the open spaces that are void of gross mat-
ter . . . I remain somewhat doubtful that I have sufficiently understood his views. 
(Hartley [1746] 1959, p. 4)
29 Cf. Wolfe (2010b), Downing (2012), and Schofield (1978).
30 Newton ([1730] 1952, Queries 14, 23, 31).
31 Hartley (1749, pp. 13–14), Guerlac (1977, p. 162). Schofield fails to correctly assess the import 
of the Newtonian analogy here: he thinks that Hartley’s variant on æther theory “obtained an 
anomalous longevity” from its connection to the extension of Lockean philosophy known as 
associationist psychology (Schofield 1970, p. 198). But Schofield is missing a crucial dimension 
of Hartley’s theory: its merit lies less in its “truth” (i.e., claims about vibrations) than in the idea 
that complex intellectual operations can be resolved into simple ones by the laws of association, 
i.e., its contribution to methodology.
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Hartley described these vibrations as
motions backwards and forwards of the small particles; of the same kind with 
the oscillations of pendulums, and the tremblings of the particles of sounding 
bodies. They must be conceived to be exceedingly short and small, so as not 
to have the least efficacy to disturb or move the whole bodies of the nerves 
of brain. For that the nerves themselves should vibrate like musical strings is 
highly absurd. (Hartley 1749, vol. I, pp. 11–12)
(What vibrates are the infinitesimal medullary particles.) By their differences in degree, 
kind, and place, these vibrations represent different primary sensations, or “simple ideas” 
in the brain. These become increasingly disposed to vibrate in any particular mode by each 
repetition of the sensation. Other vibrations, especially if they arrive at the brain simulta-
neously, may also induce this mode of vibration and become associated with it. The two 
(or more) vibrations modify one another, causing recollection of sensation, and by exten-
sion creating chains of induced vibrations called ideas, or more complex concepts.32
Hartley followed Newton extensively, in his account of sensation and the nervous 
system, but also in his methodology:
The proper method of philosophizing seems to be, to discover and establish the 
general laws of action, affecting the subject under consideration, from certain 
select, well-defined, and well attested phaenomena, and then to explain and 
predict other phaenomena by these laws. This is the method of analysis and 
synthesis recommended and followed by Sir Isaac Newton. (Hartley 1749, vol. 
1, p. 6)
In addition—and unlike any other of the thinkers discussed here—Hartley also 
expressed the familiar Newtonian denial that the vibratory theory of mind could imply 
or entail materialism:
It may be proper to remark here, that I do not, by thus ascribing the perfor-
mance of sensation to vibrations excited in the medullary substance, in the least 
presume to assert, or intimate, that Matter can be endowed with the power of 
sensation. (Hartley 1749, vol. 1, p. 33)
Buffon, Maupertuis, and Hartley extend the usage of Newtonian explanations or theo-
retical constructions far beyond what we saw in § 1, but in none of these cases is the 
32 Hartley (1749, vol. 1, pp. 13–16). See further Yolton (1983, pp. 180–184), Smith (1987, p. 124).
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Newtonian ‘unknown’ put to major use in theory construction:  while these figures 
are not engaged in literal transposition, they are also not engaged in methodological 
innovation.
9.4 HALLER: A PHYSIOLOGY OF ‘PLACE-HOLDERS’
A much more complex case of a medical Newtonian, or rather a physiological 
Newtonian, is that of the great physiologist and avid experimenter Albrecht von Haller 
(1709–1777). First, Haller was a Newtonian in a broad sense, stressing experimental-
ism, the search for laws rather than essences, and the rejection of hypotheses (even if 
the views of the “real Newton” on hypotheses were more complicated). But second, 
Haller was a Newtonian in a more sophisticated sense: on the model of Newton’s pre-
senting an explanation on a level of more complex structures than those of the atoms 
of attraction due to the inaccessibility of the cause of motion, Haller postulated irrita-
bility as a complex property that is not subject to the common laws of motion (Steinke 
2005, p. 115), and also reflected on the status of hypotheses in a less dismissive way 
(pp. 75–77). (In a further move that will be central to my analysis here, vitalists will 
use this analogy to postulate ‘Life’.) In his 1812 History of the Royal Society, Thomas 
Thomson observed that as the mathematico-mechanical model of how to do medi-
cine began to lose its revolutionary fervor and promise of success in the eighteenth 
century, physiologists took hold of either of two “systems” with which to justify vital 
phenomena, “the more ancient [system] explaining every thing by the action of a living 
principle, and the more modern by a principle somewhat indefinite, to which they gave 
the name of irritability”;33 the same insight had been stated—sometimes respectfully 
toward Haller, sometimes polemically as in Bordeu—by most of the Montpellier vital-
ists to whom I turn in the next section.
Irritability was a quantifiable, experimentally accessible property of the muscle 
fibres, to be studied mechanistically, through a correlation between a measurable 
degree of irritation and a degree of irritation of the fibres: between structure and func-
tion. There is no metaphysics of living matter here, at least superficially—and Haller 
goes out of his way to oppose his experimentally grounded concept of irritability to 
his predecessor Francis Glisson’s concept, which he portrayed (successfully in light 
of subsequent history of science) as an entirely speculative, metaphysical construct of 
matter as inherently appetitive (Giglioni 2008). For on the one hand, indeed, Haller 
wanted to define irritability so as to rule out “speculative hidden qualities” (Steinke 
2005, p. 106). But on the other hand, when pushed as to the reason why certain types 
33 Thomson (1812, p.120), cited in Brown (1974, p. 183, n. 16).
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of organic matter possess such properties, Haller first attributes it to the “gluten” within 
the fibre (“l’irritabilité est en vérité une force particulière à la glu animale,”34 although 
he wavers on this), and then, coming dangerously close to just as metaphysical a vital-
ism as Glisson, attributes this “vitality” to a hidden force, the vis insita:
The heart and intestines, also the organs of generation, are governed by a vis 
insita, and by stimuli. These powers do not arise from the will; nor are they less-
ened or excited, or suppressed, or changed by the same. No custom, no art can 
make these organs subject to the will, which owe their motions to a vis insita; 
nor can it be brought about, that they should obey the commands of the soul, 
like attendants on voluntary motion. (Haller [1779, § CCCCIX, pp. 198–199; 
1786, vol. 1, pp. 237–238]).35
Of course, for Haller forces were essentially linked to matter (as vis insita), while 
for Newton (at least the textbook picture of Newton) they were not so. Nerves don’t 
move muscles according to a mechanical force, but convey or transmit (fait parve-
nir) to muscles, the force that makes them contract, “whether this force is a fluid, or 
whether we have as of yet no idea of what it is” (Haller 1756, ch. 4, § IX, pp. 238–239). 
More generally, “Gravitation, attraction, elasticitity, effervescence, and irritability are 
so many sources of movement, in which the soul has no part, and which produce their 
effects without one needing to invoke a thinking being as their author” (Haller 1772, 
p. 250). Unlike more analogical Newtonians, Haller didn’t use the conceptual flexibil-
ity Newtonianism offers to postulate unknowns (or almost didn’t do so, as I discuss 
below); instead, he promoted the geometrical method, although he admitted that it 
produced limited results in earlier generations of the life sciences:
I shall not insist on the usefulness of mathematics in the animal economy. It 
is evident in the functions of the eye, but is not with regard to the movements 
of the vital organs. Up until now, the calculators have arrived at such opposed 
results that they have put off modern physiologists from any use of geometry. 
(Haller 1777b, p. 105a)
He added that it would, however, be the “perfection of science,” if the movements of the 
animal body and their “mechanical causes could be subjected to calculation” (p. 105a, 
my emphasis). But we have “not yet reached this point, which I so strongly desire.”
34 Haller to Bonnet, March 15, 1755, in Sonntag (1983, p. 63).
35 The original Latin is in Haller (1747 [1765], ch. 11, ‘Motus muscularis’, § CCCCIX, p. 184, and 
see pp. 181–184 overall).
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Haller did not literally transpose Newtonian explanations into physiology, like 
Pitcairne and others, discussed above. This has led some interpreters to doubt whether 
it really is appropriate to describe Haller as having a “Newtonian physiology,” as Roe 
(1984) claimed.36 But in my sense Haller is working with, or within a Newtonian con-
ceptual space that is weakly analogical; whether or not irritability is really like attrac-
tion, or whether Hallerian forces are more ontologically material than Newtonian 
forces, is not the decisive point here. My concern is not to determine who was in fact a 
‘real Newtonian’ but rather, to stress the role Newtonian concepts (or analogies) played 
in these theoretical articulations of Life (living systems, organisms, biological entities, 
etc.); “not what Newton said but what he enabled people to say” (Schlanger [1971] 
1995, p. 100). Most tellingly for my analysis, in a late entry written for the Encyclopédie 
d’Yverdon (the later, Swiss version of Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie) entitled 
“Faculté vitale,” Haller used the ‘judge a cause by its effects’ principle to assert that 
we can posit vital properties as unknowns (he says “as x”), until the day comes when 
we can fill in their mechanisms and “erase” the “x.”37 That Haller begins to resemble a 
vitalist is one outcome of this analysis, but we shall not explore it further here. What 
it would mean to be a vitalist in this specifically Newtonian context is the topic of the 
next section.
9.5 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VITALISM AS 
“PRUDENT POSITIVISM” RATHER THAN 
“IMPENITENT METAPHYSICS”
‘Vitalism’ here refers specifically to the ‘Montpellier vitalists’, that is, the group of physi-
cians and professors of medicine (and anatomy, botany, etc.) at the Faculty of Medicine 
at Montpellier, beginning in the mid-eighteenth century. The term ‘vitalist’ was applied 
to this group from approximately 1800, and indeed served as a self-description dur-
ing those decades, although some, like Paul-Joseph Barthez, declared that he did 
not want to be considered as “le Chef de la Secte des Vitalistes” (Barthez 1806, p. 98, 
n. 18). Given their shared insistence on sensibility as the sole, defining property of liv-
ing beings (against Haller’s basic distinction between irritability and sensibility), the 
36 For criticisms of this view, Duchesneau (1982, p. 154) and Steinke (2005, pp. 115f). Hall has 
a different way of denying that Haller is a Newtonian: he thinks that the biological ‘analogs’ of 
attraction are not Haller’s quantifiable concepts such as the irritability of muscular fibres, but 
rather, more archaic concepts such as sympathies and vital flame, as in Fernel and Paracelsus. It 
should be clear that my approach is different; regardless, Schofield is also mistaken to deny that 
there is any Newtonianism in Haller! (Schofield 1978, p. 184).
37 Haller (1772, p. 244b).
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vitalists could just as easily have been called ‘sensibilists’; although Henri Fouquet, 
when reflecting on their movement in an 1803 work, simply stated that the terms 
amount to the same thing, since “whatever is sensitive is vital” (Fouquet 1803, p. 78). 
Sensibility was thus presented as the primary and general property of living beings 
(tantamount to life, as Fouquet says), so that the distinction between irritability and 
sensibility was jettisoned, contra Haller.
Montpellier vitalism did not rely on an idea of vital force or substance as some-
thing distinct from the physical, causal world; its concepts of ‘animal economy’ and 
organisation were distinct from classical mechanistic concepts without being thereby 
anti-mechanistic (or ‘organismic’ like the concepts of Leibniz or Stahl). I have referred 
to this conceptual status elsewhere as ‘expanded mechanism’ and its explanations as 
‘structural-functional’ (Wolfe 2011a; for the latter term see also Duchesneau 1982). 
In fact, this very distinctive feature of Montpellier vitalism, which contrasts with ani-
mism and Naturphilosophie, but also with later forms of vitalism, relies strongly on the 
Newtonian analogy, as a means for dismissing metaphysics and pleading for ‘safe sci-
ence’. Consider Canguilhem’s bold statement that serves as my epigraph:
Eighteenth-century vitalists are not . . . impenitent metaphysicians but rather 
prudent positivists, which is to say, in that period, Newtonians. Vitalism is first 
of all the rejection of all metaphysical theories of the essence of life. This why 
most of the vitalists referred to Newton as the model of a scientist concerned 
with observation and experiment. . . . (Canguilhem 1977, p. 113)
Canguilhem’s assertion extends beyond the historical record, but it was indeed the case 
that various eclectic, hybrid, and innovative figures in Enlightenment ‘biomedicine’ 
explicitly made use of different versions of the ‘Newtonian analogy’.38 Haller is only one 
of the more prominent examples: “The measure of forces consists in their effects,” and 
“One will never know the mechanical source from which the movements that follow 
irritation arise, but one will approach this . . . in measuring the effect.”39
The principle that ‘the first cause shall be posited and then studied through its 
effects’ is repeated in various versions throughout this period, from Haller to Caspar 
38 Gaissinovitch (1968, pp. 105–106), Brown (1974, 1981), Roe (1984, pp. 288–290). For dissent-
ing views, cf. Hall (1968, esp. pp. 13–20, the use of analogy goes back to ancient medicine and is 
thus not specifically Newtonian) and Duchesneau (1982, p. 154, the physiological invocation of 
an “unknown x” is not an explanation that reduces down to the level of atoms of attraction, and 
hence is not really Newtonian). For a reassessment of Haller as Newtonian, see Steinke (2005, 
ch. 3).
39 Haller (1757, vol. 1, p. 426), Haller (1777b, p. 105) in Roe (1984, p. 282).
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Friedrich Wolff ’s “it is enough that we know that it is, and that we know it according 
to its effects,” Bichat’s praise of Newton for being the one who brought together “the 
simplicity of causes and the multiplicity of effects,” or Bonnet’s comment that he will 
“grant” irritability like the Newtonian grants attraction: “as a certain fact, the cause of 
which I  ignore, without reasoning any less well on its consequences.”40 Buffon’s ver-
sion is more complicated:  if we know the “general cause,” phenomena could easily 
be “deduced from it” if “the action of the forces producing them were not so complex” 
(although in fact, the “system of the world” is too chaotic for that: “quel cahos on a eu 
à débrouiller”).41 If anything, being an anti-Newtonian (like Johann Hatzfeld or John 
Toland)—whether out of ideological motivations, and/or because of a particular focus 
on vital matter, or at least a chemically laden concept of matter—was rare. The point is, 
Newtonian science was ‘safe science’. In Query 31 of the Opticks, Newton had suggested 
that, just as the ordinary course of Nature is controlled by the attractions of gravitation, 
magnetism, and electricity, there may be other kinds of attractions in other areas:
As in mathematics, so in natural philosophy, the investigation of difficult things 
by the method of analysis, ought ever to precede the method of composition. 
This analysis consists in making experiments and observations, and in drawing 
general conclusions from them by induction, and admitting of no objections 
against the conclusions, but such as are taken from experiments, or other cer-
tain truths . . .  . By this way of analysis, we may proceed from compounds to 
ingredients, and from motions to the forces producing them: and in general, 
from effects to their causes, and from particular causes to more general ones, 
till the argument end in the most general. This is the method of analysis: and 
the synthesis consists in assuming the causes discover’d, and establish’d as prin-
ciples, and by them explaining the phaenomena proceeding from them, and 
proving the explanations. (Newton [1730] 1952, pp. 401–402)42
Canguilhem suggests that eighteenth-century vitalists were not “impenitent metaphy-
sicians but rather prudent positivists, which is to say, in the language of the period, 
Newtonians.” An imprudent metaphysician would posit the existence of a substance 
or force; a prudent vitalist (leaving aside the term ‘positivist’) would, following Query 
31, “not seek for other causes of phenomena besides experimental causes, i.e., causes 
40 Wolff ([1764] 1966, p. 160), Bichat (1801, “Considérations générales,” p. xxxii–xxxiii), Bonnet, 
Tableau des Considérations sur les corps organisés, in Bonnet (1783, vol. 7, p. 56).
41 Preuves de la théorie de la terre, article I, in Buffon (1749, vol. 1, p. 130).
42 On the significance of Newton’s Query for Boerhaave and subsequent physician-philosophers, 
see Duchesneau (1997, pp. 302–304).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Feb 10 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199337095.indd   240 2/10/2014   7:52:31 PM
241 Role of Newtonian Analogies in 18th-Century Life Science
which determine the order of succession of these phenomena by the results of experi-
ment,” in Barthez’s words (Barthez 1858, “Discours préliminaire,” 10n.)—we could also 
call this empiricism.
With the goal of ‘modeling’ vital properties of which we do not know the ultimate 
structural cause, various Newtonian biologies and biomedicines emerged, recurrently 
claiming like Barthez that “we cannot know the essence of causes, but only the regu-
lar lawlike relations among phenomena; phenomena governed by the same laws can 
be considered effects of the same cause” (Lesch 1984, p. 25), a clear echo of Newton’s 
rule II in the Principia. Barthez also used the language of analogy. He acknowledged 
that the credibility of facts is undoubtedly “proportional to the intellectual ability and 
truthfulness of the observer,” but stressed that a fact is only truly credible if its articula-
tion “displays an intimate relation to many other facts that are already known, but have 
been imperfectly observed,” and ultimately “falls under the heading of certain essen-
tial analogies with other, numerous facts that themselves have not been challenged by 
learned men” (Barthez 1858, p. 33). Most overtly, Barthez said he would analyze the 
“something” that differentiates living bodies from dead bodies like one analyzes the 
“unknown quantities” of the geometricians:
That element found in living beings which is not found in the dead, we shall call 
Soul, Archaeus, Vital Principle, X, Y, Z, like the unknown quantities of the geo-
metricians. We only need to determine the value of this unknown, the assump-
tion of which facilitates and shortens the calculation of phenomena. (Barthez 
1806, vol. 1, p. 16; Barthez 1858, vol. 1, p. 18n.)
From a different corner of Europe, at the avant-garde of Newtonian biomedicine, 
Haller had stated the point in perhaps the most definitive way, in the “Faculté vitale” 
entry discussed above:
Every time we see effects, the mechanical cause of which is unknown to us, 
we can refer to this cause as a faculty, like we refer to an unknown quantity as 
x. If luminous experiments or perfected anatomy [enabled us to] discover the 
mechanism which produces this effect, we would then erase the place-holder 
name [nom d’attente, emphasis in original], as one erases the character marking 
an unknown quantity. (Haller 1772, p. 244b)43
43 Barthez’s comment about the ‘unknown quantity’ sounds suspiciously like Haller’s earlier 
remark.
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The idea is that the relevant biological property—in Haller’s case, irritability—will be 
epistemically treated in the way that Newton treated gravity, as “a (provisionally) inex-
plicable explicative device” (Hall 1968, p. 14). Hartley treated his own object, aether, in 
precisely these terms: “Let us suppose the existence of the aether, with these its proper-
ties, to be destitute of all direct evidence, still, if it serves to explain a great variety of 
phenomena, it will have an indirect evidence in its favor by this means.”44
The Montpellier physician François Boissier de Sauvages asserted a characteristi-
cally vitalist identification between the “laws of organic sympathies,” the existence of 
which he believed to be confirmed, and a Newtonian-type unknown:  “the detail of 
these laws is only known to us through abstraction” (Sauvages 1771, § CCVXXXVII, 
p. 276). Ménuret described nosology as “following the path Newton suggests to the 
physicist,” rather than as a “stubborn search for causes” (Ménuret [1765a] 1966, 
p. 232a). In his entry “Observation,” he opposed Newton the physicist, who was close 
to observation, to Descartes the experimenter ([1765b] 1966, p. 314b), and la Caze 
praised Newton as the author of a system rather than as a man of experiment (la 
Caze 1755, p. 19): whether or not all of these statements are fully consistent with one 
another, they testify to the existence of a ‘vitalist Newton’, i.e., a Newton constructed by 
the vitalists. Indeed, this has been described as a basic feature of Montpellier vitalism, 
particularly
its concepts of the specifically vital in living things that made use of analogs to 
Newtonian gravitation. Sauvages . . . thought the key to medicine lay in nosol-
ogy, or the classification of diseases according to their symptoms. He [argued 
for] a ‘philosophical nosology’ that would explain the bodily processes underly-
ing disease states by faculties peculiar to the living body. These faculties were 
no less efficacious for being, like gravity or elasticity, unknown in their essence. 
(Lesch 1984, p. 25)
I have already noted the various iterations of the principle that ‘the first cause shall 
be posited and then studied through its effects’. Some of these versions place more 
stress on the unknown dimension of the “provisionally inexplicable explicative device,” 
some less. Some, like Cabanis, present the claim in the language of facts: “general facts 
are what they are; and today there is no more point in explaining sensibility in animal 
physics and rational philosophy than there is in explaining attraction in the physics of 
masses” (Cabanis 1802, p. 157). Slightly more sophisticated, but also closer-sounding to 
Haller’s ‘place-holder’, is Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s formulation of the principle, 
44 Hartley (1749, vol. 1, p. 15).
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which returns explicitly to the analogy between vital force and Newtonian explica-
tive unknowns in order to articulate his concept of a Bildungstrieb, or formative drive 
(nisus formativus):
the term Bildungstrieb . . . explains nothing itself, rather it is intended to designate 
a particular force whose constant effect is to be recognized from the phenom-
ena of experience, but whose cause, just like the causes of all other universally 
recognized natural forces, remains for us an occult quality. (Blumenbach 1797, 
p. 18, cited in Lenoir 1980, p. 83)
Yet another instance of the Newtonian analogy in the search for vital proper-
ties occurs in a somewhat unexpected author, Claude Bernard, who is sometimes 
presented as the “Newton of a blade of grass,” the existence or possibility of which 
Kant had denied (Kant 1787, § 75, B, pp. 337–338, in Kant 1987, pp. 282–283):  i.e., 
the thinker who modeled the mechanisms and processes powering organic beings, 
which Bernard called “living machines.” This is not the place to determine whether 
there ever can be a Newton of a blade of grass in Kantian terms (likely not, even if 
Cuvier declared that there was no reason why “natural history should not have its own 
Newton” [Cuvier 1825, p. 4]), but Bernard stated his own version of our analogy, in 
marked anti-essentialist terms:
[N] either physiologists nor physicians must imagine it their task to seek the 
cause of life or the essence of disease: that would be entirely a waste of time, 
pursuing a phantom. The words “life,” “death,” “health,” and “disease” have no 
objective reality. These are literary expressions which we use because they rep-
resent the appearance of certain phenomena to our minds. In this we must imi-
tate the physicists and say what Newton said about attraction. (Bernard 1865, 
Part II, ch. 1, sec. iv, pp. 114–115)45
The analogy was put to work more concretely as well. Ménuret applied this kind of 
reasoning to sphygmology—the branch of medicine concerned with the pulse (Terada 
45 Bernard then includes a passage in quotations that sounds ‘Newtonian’ but is not by Newton, 
not least because it includes anachronistic formulations such as “here is the fact, here is the real.” 
He gives the example of bodies falling according to the force of gravity without our knowing 
the exact existence of this force, with the Latin phrase quasi esset attractio, which Bernard may 
have found in the works of the Baron Massias (either his 1825 Problème de l’esprit humain or his 
1830 Traité de philosophie psycho-physiologique), which provide a methodological summary of 
Newton on attraction, “quasi esset attractio” (Massias 1825, p. 129; Massias 1830, p. 357).
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2006)—because it is a case where a direct structural or otherwise substantival analy-
sis completely misses the target:  the functioning of the pulse requires an expectant, 
observational attitude that is not an inductive attitude that makes inferences from 
particulars to general laws, but rather, as regards methodology, an “extrapolation, 
interpolation and other combinations of partial generalisations” (Kolak and Symons 
2004, p. 214). This methodology of extrapolation and interpolation is the opposite of 
an interventionist and ontologically committed approach. Similarly with the function-
ing of the glands, the topic of Bordeu’s best-known work, the Recherches anatomiques 
sur la position et la fonction des glandes (1751). Their secretory action poses a problem 
to the mechanist, and the vitalist approach involved positing of a kind of ‘sensation’ 
within the glands. As Elizabeth Williams puts it,
Mechanists had long attributed glandular action to the compression of glandu-
lar bodies by surrounding muscle and bone, but by 1750 it was widely recog-
nized that this approach did nothing to explain why particular glands secreted 
particular fluids. Indeed it was in regard to this problem that vitalists first made 
inroads against mechanists, denying the explanatory power of such a model for 
glandular action and substituting for it a view based on the ‘internal sensations’ 
alluded to earlier, specifically the ‘taste’ or ‘desire’ of the gland that determined 
which components of blood it drew to itself and acted upon in furtherance of 
its specific function. (Williams 2012, p. 398)
A higher-level instantiation of this method for describing phenomenal regular-
ity through these kinds of syntheses of different generalizations is the concept of the 
“animal economy” as Ménuret described it:  “this term, taken in the most exact and 
common sense, refers only to the order, mechanism, and overall set of the functions 
and movements which sustain life in animals” (Ménuret [1765c] 1996, p. 362a). The 
Newtonian analogy is an important component of the vitalist construction of the ani-
mal economy as a structural-functional model of living being; it is a particular instance 
of what Rom Harré described in general about the formation of scientific theories: “in 
a creative piece of theory construction, the relation between the model of the unknown 
mechanism and what it is modeled on is also a relation of analogy. Thus, at the heart 
of a [scientific] theory are various modeling relations which are types of analogy.”46
Of course, one can also be skeptical about the concrete significance of the 
Newtonian analogy, and ask what it does beyond being an analogy? This can be called 
the ‘where are the equations?’ objection. In fact, plenty of physiologists in this period 
46 Harré (1970, p. 35), reprinted in (Harré 2004); Duchesneau (1982, p. 490, n. 13).
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did supply equations. Some medical Newtonians, like James Keill, Stephen Hales, or 
Buffon, extended the scope of Newtonian explanations, whether literally (§ 1 above) or 
non-literally (§ 2), whereas others, such as the vitalists, articulated their claims on the 
basis of an analogy, a “transfert de méthodologie” as Rey calls it (Rey 1992, p. 402).
But this distinction is not absolute either, as we also find Sauvages attempting 
to extend Newtonian calculations, and deliberately imitating the form of Newton’s 
Principia (axioms, corollaries, lemmas, etc.) in his 1740 treatise on vital motions; 
Sauvages sought to apply Newtonian laws of motion across the board. He asserted 
that he was a Newtonian because he did not reduce all corporeal phenomena to a 
particular substance or entity (be it a fluid, electricity, or a specific mechanism). In 
his 1752 Dissertation sur les médicaments he called this “following physical causes” 
rather than “mechanical causes”; the latter include shape, size, and mass, whereas 
physical causes are “general phenomena, the mechanical causes of which are not inves-
tigated; rather, [these phenomena] are used to immediately account for many other 
phenomena.”47 Sounding again more like a literal-extension Newtonian than an ana-
logical Newtonian, Sauvages also explained that he was willing to eliminate terms like 
‘vital force’ from his vocabulary, if others eliminated ‘elasticity’ or ‘gravity’, since in 
all these “we do not know the essence of these terms.”48 Closer to Boerhaave or Keill, 
Sauvages also defended the pertinence and indeed inevitability of mechanical explana-
tions in medicine in his Nosologia, citing Newton and Bernoulli (and stressing in the 
“Prolegomena” to this work that medicine needs mathematics if it is to make successful 
conjectures, referring to ‘s Gravesande among others). In his earlier work on diseases, 
Sauvages explicitly related his work to the “beautiful discoveries of Baglivi, Bellini, 
Pitcairne, Keill, Newton, Boerhaave, Michelotti, Bernoulli” who by “applying math-
ematics” to physics and anatomy, have revealed “many secrets of nature.”49 However, 
Sauvages also thought there were processes specific to living beings, which he detailed 
in chemical terms (e.g., fermentation and putrefaction). That is, the “faculties” of the 
body are equivalent to the properties of matter in general (e.g., gravity, elasticity, and 
attraction) but within the organism these faculties produce processes of fermentation 
and putrefaction that seem to be restricted to living beings.50
Regardless, one should distinguish between the vitalist analogy and the extension of 
equations in Newtonian biomedicine, as the former is more systemic, while the latter is 
more rigidly mechanical, in the sense that systemic concepts (often credited to Newton 
47 Sauvages (1770, vol. 2, p. 3), Sauvages (1752, pp. 11–14, 26, 33–35), Sauvages (1771, vol. 1, 
pp. 60–61, 89), Martin (1990, p. 131), Williams (2003, pp. 84, 88–89).
48 Sauvages ([1763] 1771, vol. 1, § 209, p. 64).
49 Sauvages ([1763] 1771, vol. 1, p. 492; vol. 1, p. 9), Sauvages (1731, p. 2).
50 Sauvages ([1763] 1771, vol. 1, §§ 150–154, 261, 266).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Feb 10 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199337095.indd   245 2/10/2014   7:52:31 PM
246 Newtonian Method in 18th- and 19th-Century Science
through the nineteenth century) produce a model of a diverse set of phenomena, a 
more or less abstract picture of how such phenomena, whether they be planetary, eco-
nomic, or biological, can be expected to behave at each instant and over time,51 as is 
notably also the case in Bernard’s physiology. At any rate, if vitalism ‘transfers method-
ology’ by analogical reasoning, rather than extending the quantitative approach, then 
the question ‘where are the equations?’ is not the relevant one. My point is both that 
the usage of ‘unknowns’ as a basis for bringing together a cluster of phenomena was a 
key feature of physiological thinking in this period, and that the vitalists employed this 
in such a way as to conceive of vitality without locating it in a special substance.
Consider again the case of Barthez. After having initially asserted the existence of 
an independent vital force, he appeared chastened by some reactions to his ontologi-
cal fervor, and added a chapter to the second edition of his book entitled “Skeptical 
considerations on the nature of the vital principle” (Barthez 1858, vol. 3, pp. 96f.). 
Barthez warned that one should follow an “invincible skepticism” (p. 32) or a “rea-
sonable Pyrrhonism” (p. 274) when it comes to the vital principle. He only “personi-
fied” the vital principle, he explained, for ease of argument (p. 126). What does it 
mean to investigate the nature of life skeptically? Contrary to what one might expect, 
it does not mean to approach vital phenomena with a demystifying, deflationary atti-
tude, but rather, to attribute properties to the vital principle “that result immediately 
from experience” (p. 126). Now, while it is not the case that Barthez was always so 
cautious (and to be fair, which ‘natural philosopher’ of the previous hundred years 
gave a wholly consistent articulation of the experimental and programmatic sides 
of their work?), we need only retain his Newtonian insistence that the nature of the 
vital principle itself is not at stake. For Barthez, it was logically possible to replace 
this idea of an ‘entity’ with something more “abstract,” a “faculty of the human body, 
the essence of which is unknown to us, but which possesses motor and sensitive 
force” (p. 126). Thus he could assert that the vital principle is not a substance (p. 113) 
and that the “science of man” he is defining is precisely not an ontology (p. 129): “I 
am as indifferent as could be regarding Ontology considered as the science of enti-
ties.”52 This sounds quite close to that other ‘vital Newtonian’, Haller, who used vari-
ous terms such as vis insita but tended to keep them at a distance; indeed in his late 
article “Faculté vitale,” Haller refers, as we saw, to such terms as ‘place-holders’ (noms 
d’attente).53
The diverse usages of the Newtonian analogy in eighteenth-century life science 
were not, to be sure, the extension of a quantitative, experimental set of methods 
51 Depew and Weber (1996, Introduction).
52 Barthez (1806, p. 96, note 17).
53 Haller (1772, p. 244b), see also (Haller 1777a, pp. 663f).
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directly transposed from mechanics and the physical sciences (with Haller being 
something of an exception here, as he both engaged in some of this transposition, 
and worked with the theory-modeling dimensions of the analogy). But nor are 
they, as was sometimes presented in scholarly literature, mere window dressing, 
putting new ideas in Newtonian garb “to retain [its] prestige for newer views.”54 
However, it would be a mistake to imagine that Newtonian models seamlessly 
replaced earlier models, or that avant-garde natural philosophers in a Radical 
Enlightenment context were all necessarily Newtonian. I now consider one type 
of reaction that, instead of taking Newtonian methodology or theory-modeling 
insights as fruitful stimuli, frowned upon the encroachment of the physical sci-
ences onto the complex of medicine, natural history, physiology, and overall what 
we would be tempted to call ‘biology’.55 Two particular instances of this reaction, 
which combined a chemical conception of matter with philosophical materialism, 
are Mandeville and Diderot.
9.6 ANTI-MATHEMATICISM: MANDEVILLE AND DIDEROT
Programmatic ideas for how to conceptualize the life sciences—their scope, their 
method, and their boundaries—in the mid- to late-eighteenth century often appealed 
to Newtonian insights, as we have seen. From Haller to the Montpellier vitalists, 
this kind of approach sought to capitalize on the power of the Newtonian analogy, 
without any metaphysical or experimental claim to be doing a “different kind of sci-
ence.” But some other approaches, which also had a strong affinity to vitalism, albeit 
in the form of a ‘vital materialism’ (Reill 2005, Wolfe 2009), were more opposed to 
physico-mathematical encroachment onto the territory of the life sciences. And they 
are empiricist.
One form of anti-mathematicism in life science was the physician Bernard 
Mandeville’s skeptical attitude (itself reminiscent of Sydenham’s hostility to 
mechanism-friendly anatomical experimentation) toward quantitative, numerical 
approaches in medicine. In his Treatise of Hypochondriack and Hysterical Diseases 
(1711, revised 1730), which is in dialogue form, Mandeville addressed the pertinence 
of Newtonianism in medicine rather skeptically (Mandeville 1730, pp. 175, 201). The 
character Philoprio, who various hints identify as Mandeville, specifies that it is in the 
54 Schofield (1970, p. 191). A similar view is found in Schlanger ([1971] 1995, p. 105).
55 For further discussion of the status of these sciences prior to the emergence of this nomencla-
ture, see Wolfe (2011b).
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realm of practice that he cannot see the usefulness of mathematics. The other character, 
Misomedon notes that it may be a matter of time:
But the Scheme of bringing Mathematicks into the Art of Medicine is not of 
many Years standing yet. The Newtonian Philosophy, which I believe has in a 
great measure been the Occasion of the Attempt, was not made publick before 
the latter End of the last Century: And considering the vast Extent the Art of 
Physick is of, both as to Diseases incident to human Bodies, and the Medicines 
that are made use of, great length of time must be required before an entire 
System can be form’d, that shall be applicable to all Cases, and by the Help of 
which; Men shall be able to explain all Phenomena that may occur, and solve 
all the Difficulties and Objections that may be made. (Mandeville 1730, p. 181)
Obviously, in the mechanical approach to the structure of the body, we need math-
ematics. “All Fluids likewise are subject to the laws of Hydrostaticks” (p. 179). But if we 
do not know the exact nature of the elements of these entities, calculations are point-
less (p. 183). What physicians want to know and they lack is (a) the causes of diseases 
and (b) the properties (“virtues”) of each remedy in the materia medica (p. 183). An 
exact mathematico-mechanical model in which the dose of the remedy is proportion-
ate to the quantity of blood in the individual (ceteris paribus, Mandeville says!) is false, 
since temperaments or individual natures as encountered by the physician do not obey 
such laws (p. 187).
Recall that this was a core claim of the Scottish iatromechanist (and medical 
Newtonian) William Cockburn, some decades earlier: that “the doses of medicaments 
necessary to elicit a certain effect are proportional to the quantity of the blood” in 
the individual (Cockburn and Southwell 1704, p.  2119). A  similar objection to the 
‘medical Newtonians’ was made by a late figure of Montpellier vitalism, Jean Charles 
Marguerite Guillaume de Grimaud, whose medical thesis on irritability was published 
only under his initials (“D. G.”) in 1776. Grimaud explicitly targeted Keill and others 
on their claims to quantify muscular action, combining mathematical criticisms with 
appeals to empirical evidence, ranging from the bizarre feats of muscular strength in 
the animal world to King Augustus II of Poland’s ability to bend horseshoes with two 
fingers (Grimaud 1776, pp. 33, 35). Mandeville gives the example of water: the differ-
ence between cold water, which we drink with pleasure and is necessary to our sur-
vival, and hot water, which makes us vomit, is not a difference that can be measured in 
its mass (Mandeville 1730, pp. 192–194).
If he was not (quite) a mechanist, how does Mandeville account for the physiologi-
cal processes that apparently underlie our mental life? In chemical terms, appealing 
to “ferment” concepts in medicine (p. 17), naming “Concoction” as “that which is the 
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basis of the whole Oeconomy” (p.  84). Of course there is no absolute historical or 
conceptual opposition between Newtonianism and chemistry (Keill, Friend, Cheyne, 
and later Boerhaave, the author of the Elementa chemiae [1732], would certainly not 
approve of opposing them, either because of more pluralistic approaches to attraction, 
or because of the belief that “chymical operations” could be accounted for mechanisti-
cally: Metzger 1930, Franckowiak 2003). But thinkers such as Mandeville and Diderot 
did so, the first on practical, falsifiable grounds, and the second for reasons involving 
matter theory and broader ontological commitments.
Diderot offered a much sharper, and perhaps more ‘categorical’ form of Mandeville’s 
objection. Where Mandeville was skeptical about mechanical methods but allowed for 
their content to be gradually filled in by successful experiments (rather like Haller 
conceding that “up until now, the calculators have arrived at such opposed results that 
they have put off modern physiologists from any use of geometry”), Diderot hinted at 
a profound ontological divide between the two kinds of sciences:
We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the taste people 
seem to have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of nature and experimental 
physics, I  dare say that before a hundred years, there will not be more than 
three great geometricians remaining in Europe. The science will stop short 
where the Bernoullis, the Eulers, the Maupertuis, the Clairaut, the Fontaines 
and the D’Alemberts will have left. . . . We will not go beyond. (Diderot, Pensées 
sur l’interprétation de la nature, § IV, in Diderot 1994, p. 561)56
Diderot uses ‘geometricians’, as he often does, as a generic term for mathematicians. 
His crucial claim, whether or not it was historically validated, is that mathematics will 
just drop off or stay where it is, whereas the ‘life sciences’ (the “history of nature” or 
natural history was a term designating the cluster of activities we might today call 
biology) will take off. He meant this both as a fact about scientific activity and as an 
ontological claim, that the processes and entities life scientists seek to understand are 
not to be understood in mathematical terms.
Similarly, Buffon spoke of an “overreliance (abus) on mathematical sciences,” 
given that mathematical truths are merely “definitional truths”:  “exact and demon-
strative” but also “abstract, intellectual and arbitrary.”57 As noted in section 2, this is 
where Buffon is less of a Newtonian—when he seeks to define and delimit the realms 
of “natural history and particular physics” (physique particulière), as non-mathematical 
56 I discuss this in Wolfe (2009) and at greater length in my forthcoming paper on Diderot’s 
biologistic Spinozism (Wolfe 2014).
57 Buffon (1749, vol. 1, “Premier discours,” p. 54).
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realms. In natural history, Buffon declared, “the topics are too complicated for cal-
culations and measures to be advantageously applied.”58 And Buffon had translated 
Newton (Méthode des fluxions, 1740), just as Diderot published works on probability 
theory and attempted an analysis of Newton in his Mémoires sur différents sujets de 
mathématiques.59 In fact, Diderot’s bold claim about a “revolution in the sciences” fol-
lows shortly after a passage referring to Buffon’s criticism of abstraction.
Diderot makes two points in the above passage:  first, a claim about the revolu-
tionary dimension of life science in contrast to the ‘static’ situation of the mathemati-
cal sciences (and this is both an empirical claim and an ontological commitment to 
a materialist metaphysics of Life, Wolfe 2011b); second, a critique of mathematical 
abstraction. The latter point comes up again in a short piece of natural philosophy 
Diderot composed in 1770, the Philosophical Principles on Matter and Motion. There, 
he puts forth much the same critique with a more explicitly chemical reference:
You can practice geometry and metaphysics as much as you like; but I, who am 
a physicist and a chemist, who takes bodies in nature and not in my mind, I see 
them as existing, various, bearing properties and actions, as agitated in the uni-
verse as they are in the laboratory where if a spark is in the proximity of three 
combined molecules of saltpeter, carbon and sulfur, a necessary explosion will 
ensue. (Diderot 1975–. . ., vol. 17, p. 34)
In his lecture notes from Guillaume-François Rouelle’s chemistry course in the 1750s 
(which Diderot attended for three years), Diderot also criticized the abstractions of 
“physics” and insisted that “it is from chemistry that it learns or will learn the real 
causes” of natural phenomena.60
Newtonian-type unknowns do appear in Diderot, in his late manuscript on physi-
ology: “How many highly certain phenomena are there, whose first cause is unknown? 
Who know how movement or attraction resides in bodies? . . . These are facts, and the 
production of sensibility is another fact” (Diderot 1994, p. 1283). But the attitude that 
we saw in the two earlier quotations is predominant, whether in the form of the first 
claim (the autonomy of the biological with respect to mechanical and mathematical 
explanations) or of the second (an appeal to irreducible chemical properties). This is 
58 Buffon, De la Manière, in Buffon (1749, vol. 1, p. 62); Hoquet (2005, p. 175).
59 On Diderot’s mathematical ability (his capacity to follow differential calculus but not the work 
of Euler or D’Alembert, and his work in probability theory), see Dhombres (1985).
60 Diderot (1975, vol. 9, p.  209). His lecture notes were first published in 1887, and are now 
available in the standard edition of his works: Cours de chimie de Mr Rouelle (1756), in Diderot 
(1975, vol. 9).
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what Guédon meant by “Diderot’s anti-Newtonianism” (a rather over-inflated phrase, 
in the end): a reliance on a chemical conception of matter as possessing active proper-
ties, over and against Newton, and drawing on Rouelle’s (Stahlian) chemistry of mixts.
This anti-Newtonianism is not the standard ideological opposition to Newton as 
the patron saint of a Boyle Lectures-type natural theology, but rather an opposition to 
the ontology of action at a distance, which is also not in favor of a Cartesian physics, 
like earlier oppositions. The idea is that the project of tables of affinities, which is cen-
tral in the chemistry of Rouelle and Venel (Pépin 2012), was ontologically opposite to 
the idea of a system of Newtonian attraction. Rouelle explicitly connected the idea of 
affinities to the older idea of sympathies:
The ancient chemists noticed that certain bodies placed at a certain distance 
attracted one another. They named the cause producing this effect . . . sympathy, 
a term which modern chemists have replaced with affinity or relation, which 
does not follow the universal law of gravity . . . but that of the homogeneity of 
surfaces (Rouelle, Cours de chimie, 1754–1758, Ms., cited in Franckowiak 2003, 
p. 244).61
This can be seen as a commitment to the unbroken continuity of matter—philo-
sophically a kind of materialist position—if we supplement this passage with some of 
Diderot’s commentaries on Rouelle, extending into his idea of a universally sensing 
matter. But more recent examination suggests it is an overstatement to call Rouelle an 
“anti-Newtonian” as well (Franckowiak 2003). Indeed, the opposition between a chem-
ically ‘rich’ conception of matter and a more ‘crude’ mechanistic picture is specific to a 
given program: one could also cite chemists of the period for whom Newtonian attrac-
tion was a liberation from strict mechanism.
Moreover, Diderot’s conception of active matter (or vital matter, since all of matter 
is potentially alive in his view), his commitment to sensibility as an inherent property 
of all matter, can be traced to other sources than Rouelle’s chemistry. Schofield finds 
that Diderot’s vision of matter “resembles at worst a neo-Platonic living macrocosm 
and at best a Leibnizian pre-established harmony of self-sufficient monads” (Schofield 
1978, p. 187). Leaving aside the judgmental tone, he has noticed something impor-
tant: the Leibnizian dimension in Diderot, which marks a limit in the pertinence of the 
Newtonian analogy. Very summarily, one could say that the analogy (and the usage of 
unknowns as explicative devices) is quite useful for theory-building (as can be seen, 
e.g. in Haller, Barthez, Sauvages, and all the way to Bernard), but not for handling 
specific phenomena such as generation (Maupertuis and Diderot would concur here).
61 See also Guédon (1979, p. 191).
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Diderot’s attitude toward Newton is not easy to make out clearly, but one can sum-
marize his overall relation to the issue as follows: he has an ontological opposition to 
the mathematical treatment of life, whilst he thinks that probability theory does not 
do violence to the nature of organisms the way that, say, iatromechanism did. The 
figure of Saunderson in Diderot’s 1749 Letter on the Blind expresses strong hostility 
to ‘Newtonian deism’ or natural theology (an ideological hostility that colors some 
of his objections against action at a distance, both in an “Observation” at the end 
of the Interprétation and later in the 1761 Réflexions sur une difficulté proposée con-
tre la manière dont les newtoniens expliquent la cohésion des corps).62 Lastly, Diderot 
has a pragmatic or utilitarian attitude toward both mathematics and life science: “in 
a few centuries, it will be utility (l’utile) which will serve as a constraint for experi-
mental physics [sc. life science, CW], as it now serves as a constraint on geometry” 
(Interprétation, § VI, in Diderot 1975–. . ., vol. 9, p. 33). This is neither a belief in the 
future success of mechanism (filling in place-holders, as Haller might have had it), 
nor a categorical rejection of this possibility. In this sense it is much too strong to 
call Diderot “the supreme anti-Newtonian of the High Enlightenment,” as Jonathan 
Israel does (Israel 2006, p. 222; as noted above, Jean-Claude Guédon put forth this view 
twenty-five years earlier).
9.7 CONCLUSION
I have suggested a series of distinctions between types and usages of Newtonianism 
in eighteenth-century life science, from the more literal usage found notably in the 
‘medical Newtonians’ in the earlier part of the century, which is more quantitative 
and hardly analogical, to the very analogical Newtonianism of Montpellier vitalism. 
Several noteworthy figures can be located between these two extremes, such as Haller, 
who on the one hand employed the analogy and the usage of ‘physiological unknowns’ 
(the nom d’attente), but on the other hand also considered the application of geo-
metrical methods to physiology and medicine to be one of the greatest “perfections” 
of the science. Similarly, if we take the thinkers I surveyed in section 2, Maupertuis 
and Hartley are closer to the first type, whereas Buffon, especially as he moves fur-
ther and further into the consideration of the categories and concepts of natural his-
tory, is closer to the non-quantitative approach. One could say that these different 
Newtonian-inspired approaches to life are tantamount to different conceptions of the 
animal economy:  in some cases (Pitcairne, et  al., Haller, possibly Mandeville) there 
62 Diderot (1975, vol. 9). This is a text printed anonymously in the Journal de Trévoux in April 
1761, in which he also presents attraction as a “general property of matter” (p. 341).
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is a search for physiological laws, whereas in other cases (Barthez, Bordeu, possibly 
Diderot) there is more of an ‘observational’ attitude, an empiricism that frowns upon 
providing ultimate definitions of life.
In this sense, the variety of Newtonianisms and Newtonian analogies for concepts 
specific to the life sciences indicates that Schofield, Brown, and others are mistaken 
to state that Newtonian physiology “died” at the end of the seventeenth century,63 or 
that “much of what we know [of eighteenth-century biology], once we leave England, 
escapes our Newtonian net” (Coleman 1967, p. 269). Newtonian physiology is both 
extended, as in the case of Haller, and conceptually transformed rather than abandoned 
through the analogy, with its heuristic potential. Of course, one could object that this 
potential of the Newtonian analogy is not unique: it is also a feature of all mechanical 
analogies more broadly, for mechanism in general (not just Newtonianism) functions 
on the basis of analogies. Indeed, as Hall observed, machines in Renaissance and early 
modern science had a dual status. On the one hand, they were “facts of life,” “practical 
realities [such] as waterwheels, looms, pumps, and presses and the windmills,” which 
were “in view everywhere from the British Midlands to the Peloponnesus.” But on the 
other hand, they were also
hypothetical constructs used for explaining everything from atoms, to animals, 
to the cosmos. These abstract constructs had, in turn, two sources. They arose, 
first, as extrapolations from familiar, concrete machinery and, second, as exten-
sions or applications of abstract mathematical mechanics. (Hall 1969, vol. 1, 
p. 219)
Richard Westfall was thus mistaken in his assertion that iatromechanism “contributed 
almost nothing to understanding what was seen,” being “for the most part . . . simply 
irrelevant to biology” (Westfall 1971, p. 104). For mechanical models of Life, as well as 
their syntheses with chemical and other models, are powerful heuristics in seeking to 
understand Life.
But there is at the very least a crucial theoretical difference between mechanical and 
Newtonian analogies, or one might say, a difference in theory construction: despite the 
variety and flexibility of ‘machine models’ of Life (des Chene 2005, Wolfe 2012), they 
are not ‘systemic’ in the sense described above (e.g., with the examples of the animal 
economy or the functioning of the glands), comprising the inclusion of combinations 
of partial generalizations. Indeed, a few decades later, the Encyclopédie méthodique 
63 Schofield (1970), Brown (1977, 1981); for Brown, “Principia-style physiology, by and large, 
died with him [Newton]” (Brown 1987, p. 644).
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recommended discontinuing the usage of the term ‘machine’ to describe the body, 
as had been current in early modern French, and opposed the complexity of causal 
processes in the “animal economy,” “vital economy” or “organism,” to the “system of 
causes and effects” as presented in mechanics (“Machine,” in Encyclopédie méthodique 
1808, p. 310).
The difference between mechanical and Newtonian analogies is most marked in 
cases of strongly analogical Newtonianism. Bordeu was one of the few authors of the 
period who reflected self-consciously on the heuristic role of metaphors or analogies in 
scientific theory construction (not just as fictions to be discarded, which is of course a 
more common view). In his masterpiece, the 1751 Recherches anatomiques sur la posi-
tion et la fonction des glandes, when discussing the problem of whether the secretory 
process of the glands can be reduced to a type of sensation or not, he gently criticized 
Stahl’s notion of an anima controlling the body, while noting that both his own idea of 
sensation and Stahl’s anima are metaphors:
This is again one of these metaphors which I must be allowed; . . . It is difficult . . . 
to explain myself, when it comes to speaking of the force which so carefully 
directs a thousand singular motions in the human body and its parts; what 
terms should I use to describe them? . . .  Stahl claimed that the soul directed 
everything in the animal body. . . . I can state that all living parts are directed by 
an ever-vigilant self-preserving force; does this force belong, in certain respects, 
to the essence of a part of matter, or is it a necessary attribute of its combina-
tions? . . .  I can only suggest a way of conceiving things, metaphorical expres-
sions, comparisons. (Bordeu 1751, § CVIII, p. 163)
To say that the Stahlian concept of soul is a metaphor (which Stahl did not say!) is 
essentially to say that the concept has functional value (or not) depending on how well 
it models phenomena—rather than making a claim about what sorts of things exist. 
If Bordeu were writing sometime after the 1970s, he would quite likely have spoken 
of such images as ‘heuristics’. The popularity of the analogy between vital force and 
Newtonian gravitation, in the eyes of the vitalists, lay in the combination it offered 
of explanatory power and the absence of obligations to provide an account of vitality 
in terms of micro-structure (given that iatromechanists, whether Descartes, Borelli, 
Baglivi, or Boerhaave, consistently affirmed that micro-structural explanations dis-
pelled ambiguities inherent in chimiatric language and subsumed the variety of func-
tions under a fixed number of mechanical, indeed mathematical laws).
An interesting effect of the Newtonian analogy in eighteenth-century life science 
is that it allowed its users to focus on the properties unique to living beings with-
out either substantializing them, dissolving them into pan-mechanism, or positing a 
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transcendental ground of Life that is not itself accessible to scientific study, as in Kant’s 
influential and rather sibylline pronouncement that there will “never be a Newton 
of a blade of grass.”64 Neither Diderot nor the vitalists ontologize Life the way Kant 
does—they are heirs of empiricism. Granted, thinkers like Bordeu and Ménuret, and 
Diderot in his own context, present the organism in terms of self-organization (with 
a particular emphasis on epigenesis in Diderot, Wolfe (2014), but not in a sense that 
Kant would approve of, since in the end organisms are defined as self-organizing enti-
ties constituted by a special kind of matter (organized or living matter), producing 
particular levels of organization, without any other special principle. Of course, if we 
consider Diderot’s statement that “we are on the verge of a revolution in the sciences,” 
it can be taken to mean that the entities studied in the life sciences are fundamentally 
different, or more modestly that one should not focus on mathematics at the present 
time, but instead on areas such as natural history, a.k.a. biology (Wolfe 2009, Wolfe 
2011). Support for the former view emerges if we consider his writings more generally, 
with their focus on living matter, or sensibility as a basic property of matter. But here 
we have arrived at a point further removed from Newtonianism.
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